Showing posts with label Dead Witnesses. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dead Witnesses. Show all posts

GREGORY PROKOPOWICZ and his Dumb Gun


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The recent murder of a mother, a coworker and a guy with gun named Gregory collided with people I know.  Not this huge connection but Elaine Prokopowicz was once married to the daughter of MARIA DEMAKAS who was a regular at Round Up for their weekly Saturday night Karaoke.  Maria passed several years ago but she was ask me to sing her favorite songs when buying me a drink.  Fair enough as if you like Frankie Valle then you get your song. 
Elaine would come down to Round Up bar to spend time with her mom where it was all about having fun.  I lost track of Maria when I was attacked by another patron.  I called the Lafayette Police who failed to take action who drove off refusing to take a report which is identical to when Chief Christensen did when parties deliberately totaled my car. 
That was attempted murder but with the Contra Costa County Sheriff, City Manager Steve Falk and their pathetic City Council.  

The Pamela Vitale Murder will fall apart

  •  Acalanes Unified School District - Schools Listing 
    • Imprison or kill Students.   
  • My July 2011 Hit and Run was documented with letters and soon I’ll be appearing at the City Council meetings.   For residents of any CCSO Contract Agencies the CNET Scandal will cost you millions once the real truth emerges about multiple cover-ups.  
One of my reasons for posting this list is Maria wanted to rent a room I desperately needed from Elaine.  She needed the garden variety of help on the house, small repairs, gardening and such.   Instead I get beaten in Lafayette for no reason other than to be another leg of my long witness intimidation case. 
When the news broke about the murders I zeroed in on the 1800
PROKOPOWICZ, ELAINE PETITIONER ELAINE PROKOPOWICZ VS GREGORY PROKOPOWICZ Dissolution Without Children FLMSD09-02004 04/29/2009
PROKOPOWICZ, GREG RESPONDENT DEBORAH LYNN ALBANESE VS GREG PROKOPOWICZ Nullity Without Children FLMSD16-00583 01/26/2016
PROKOPOWICZ, GREGORY PLAINTIFF PISKOVA VS. AMUNDSON PI/PD/NON-MV CIVMSC13-02688 12/24/2013
PROKOPOWICZ, GREGORY RESTRAINED PERSON/RESPONDENT ELAINE SHIELDS VS. GREGORY PROKOPOWICZ Domestic Violence Without Children FLMSD07-00111 01/03/2007
PROKOPOWICZ, GREGORY RESPONDENT ELAINE PROKOPOWICZ VS GREGORY PROKOPOWICZ Dissolution Without Children FLMSD09-02004 04/29/2009
PROKOPOWICZ, GREGORY RESTRAINED PERSON/RESPONDENT GARY TRAVERS VS GREGORY PROKOPOWICZ Domestic Violence Without Children FLMSD17-00834 02/28/2017
PROKOPOWICZ, GREGORY DEFENDANT PIERSON VS PROKOPOWICZ SISTER STATE JUDGMENT CIVMSL17-00955 03/17/201
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CNN.COM: Prominent lawyers keep turning up dead. #deadbankers

By PETE BENNETT - Contra Costa Watch EMAIL
Phone: 510-460-5641
Posted: 01/20/2014


Walnut Creek CA -- My experience with the Contra Costa Legal Community hasn't been good.  I know they've had a lock on how the cases are settled.  In my personal experience the litigation history is enough to send them running and the State Bar should be looking at my story. 

I've had million dollar settlements queered by the legal community. My person experience with former Judge Joel Golub and his brother is a clear example legal misconduct.  I'd say it's enough for to be disbarred - I got Don Moats case in front of the State Bar and he withdrew his license voluntarily before disbarment.  

My first letter will be about the failure of Walnut Creek legal department to inform me of events that were a danger to my safety.  


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Dead Witnesses - The Big Problem facing the Contra Costa Bar Association

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Death of Public Officials - These are not accidents

By PETE BENNETT - Contra Costa Watch EMAIL

Original Post: 10/30/2013


The Witness Murders


They are all dead except the bottom three on the left.  I knew almost every victim and this was in 2013 but my first Dead Witness story started in 1982 with of my employee.





During November 2013 I intend to post a concise list of persons near elected officials or public office killed, endured untimely fates or have been murdered 

This list is good and I have no reason to retract anything as my arguments of a problem with the recent crash of the PG&E Surveillance Plane was enough for me, 1) I knew the Matt Moody via a local club, 2) It's connected to the Gas Transmission Group, 3) it missed my sons and ex-wife by three miles and the person in Row 2 First Image from left is most likely my sons half brother but was my attorneys Dax Craven's half brother son of a attorney that works for PG&E, Contra Costa County, Seeno, Safeway and Several other firms all of which have been litigation quagmires for me.  


Victims: 



  • Five are Public Officials, Servants or Elected 
  • Three are police officers (arrested and Convicted) - I know all of them some since 1988
  • One was a cop murdered who was photographed by my stalkers 
  • Three are relatives of Public Officials  
  • Three of the Public Officials have died of Spinal Meningitis- there are more cases 
  • One is my attorneys brother in-law his father represents Seeno who is going to be finally indicted. 
  • One was my neighbor
  • My long time karaoke DJ friend, his mother formerly with Solano County DA

  • Another was a Starbucks Barista, 
  • One was a bartender whose high school friend was Butlers Decoy in the 48 hours special.  She's still around gained some weight and went Blonde - she no longer shows her cleavage. 
  • The other was murdered and key suspect is a cop, has always been a cop.  


There are many more names but you can take this FBI where they'll they know already.. 


Every victim except one was killed in the last two years.  





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BYNUM v. CITY OF PITTSBURG @FederalGlover

Card image cap

Some quick example text to build on the card title and make up the bulk of the card's content.

Note:
Bernard Bynum was employed at Mainframe Designs Cabinets and Fixtures located at 545 Bliss Ave


BYNUM v. CITY OF PITTSBURGNO. C-83-5664-MHP.

622 F.Supp. 196 (1985)

Dorothy BYNUM, Sylvester Bynum and Dorothy Bynum as Administrator of the Estate of Bernard Bynum, decedent, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF PITTSBURG, Leonard Castiglione, individually and in his capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Pittsburg, Ray Giacomelli and William O'Malley, individually and in his capacity as District Attorney for the County of Contra Costa, Defendants.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

November 12, 1985.

Amended November 27, 1985.

Tito Torres, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.

James L. Hazard, Sellar, Engleking, Hazard & Snyder, Walnut Creek, Cal., ElizabethB. Hearey, Deputy County Counsel, Martinez, Cal., Jerrold M. Ladar, Stephen W. Sommerhalter, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

AMENDED OPINION


PATEL, District Judge.

This case arises out of the shooting death of Bernard Bynum by Ray Giacomelli, a police officer for the City of Pittsburg. The shooting occurred on January 27, 1982. Decedent's surviving heirs, Dorothy and Sylvester Bynum, filed this action on November 22, 1983 alleging that defendants City of Pittsburg ("Pittsburg"), police officer Ray Giacomelli ("Giacomelli"), police chief Leonard Castiglione ("Castiglione"), and district attorney William O'Malley ("O'Malley") had violated their civil rights by performing acts which caused their son to be shot to death by officer Giacomelli. Dorothy Bynum also sues in her capacity as administrator of the decedent's estate.1

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed on August 6, 1985 contains five causes of action, all based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, plaintiffs allege that defendant Giacomelli acting under color of state law deprived their son of several constitutionally protected rights, including the right not to be deprived of life without due process of law, the right to be free from excessive force, and the right to be free from battery motivated by racial prejudice. Second, they contend that defendant Castiglione instituted a policy of inadequate police training which caused the death of their son. Third, they claim that defendant Pittsburg encouraged its police department to abuse minorities causing the death of their son. Fourth, they allege that defendants Pittsburg, Castiglione, and O'Malley had a policy of exonerating officers who brutalized or killed minorities and that this policy was a proximate cause of their son's death. Finally, they allege that defendants Pittsburg and O'Malley caused their son's death by failing to prosecute law enforcement officers who brutalized or killed minorities.

Defendants Pittsburg, Giacomelli, and Castiglione filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on August 22, 1985 on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims are barred by a one year statute of limitations and that no constitutional violation is shown in the pleadings. Castiglione also moves to dismiss the second cause of action against him claiming that respondeat superior is an insufficient basis for imposing liability on him. Finally, Pittsburg asks the court to dismiss it from the fifth cause of action since it contains no allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the City. Defendant O'Malley joined in the motion to dismiss on August 23, 1985. In addition to the grounds asserted by the other defendants, O'Malley claims that the plaintiffs have no standing to bring this action, that he is absolutely immune from prosecution, and that plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable relief that they seek.

The court has considered all of the papers in support of and in opposition to these motions. For the reasons discussed below, the fifth cause of action is dismissed as to defendant City of Pittsburg and the remainder of defendants' motions to dismiss are denied.

I. O'MALLEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant O'Malley's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is based on several arguments which the court heard and rejected on July 23, 1984. On that date, the court denied O'Malley's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint based upon prosecutorial immunity, lack of survival and standing, and failure to state a claim cognizable under § 1983. It also refused to strike plaintiffs' prayer for equitable relief.2 O'Malley's arguments here amount to nothing more than a motion for reconsideration. Since he advances no new arguments, the motion is denied.

The only issue raised by O'Malley that the court must consider here is the claim that plaintiffs' action is barred by a one year statute of limitations. This is discussed below since defendants Pittsburg, Giacomelli, Castiglione also raise this claim.

II. PITTSBURG, GIACOMELLI, AND CASTIGLIONE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Defendants Pittsburg, Giacomelli, and Castiglione ask the court to dismiss this action on statute of limitations grounds in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Defendant O'Malley joins in this motion.

In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that state statutes of limitations for personal injury should be applied in § 1983 actions. Id. at 1949. The shooting of plaintiffs' son occurred on January 27, 1982; they filed suit on November 22, 1983. Defendants argue that Wilson should be applied retroactively to bar plaintiffs' causes of action under the one year California statute of limitations for personal injury.3 See Cal. Civ.Proc.Code § 340.

Defendants cite several cases from other circuits for the proposition that Wilson should be applied retroactively. All of the decisions rely upon the test announced in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), to analyze the retroactivity question. In Huson, the Supreme Court held that a decision could be applied nonretroactively if three criteria were met:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, ... by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking at the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." ... Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application....

Id. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355-56 (citations omitted).

In Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir.1985), the court used the Huson test in making its determination to apply Wilson retroactively to the case before it. The court relied heavily on the fact that the Third Circuit did not have a well-established statute of limitations in § 1983 actions prior to Wilson. The first and third prongs of the Huson test were not met since the "application of the [statute of limitations] law had been erratic and inconsistent, without clear precedent on which plaintiff could reasonably rely in waiting to file suit." Id. at 194-95. With respect to the second prong of the Huson test, the court held that "[a]lthough we cannot say that the policies referred to in Wilson v. Garcia militate clearly in favor of retroactive application, neither do they militate against such application." Id. at 196.

In this circuit, by contrast, the Huson test suggests that Wilson should not be applied retroactively.

1. WILSON ANNOUNCED NEW LAW IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Prior to Wilson, "the three-year limitations period in section 338(1) [had] long governed suits against state officialsbrought pursuant to section 1983." Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir.1980). The state of the law regarding the statute of limitations was well-settled in the Ninth Circuit. See Wilson, 105 S.Ct. at 1947 n. 35 (Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had created uniformity by adopting a uniform characterization of § 1983 actions as claims arising on a statute). Since Wilson announced a new principle of law in the Ninth Circuit, the first prong of the Huson test is met.

2. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF WILSON WOULD NOT FURTHER ITS PURPOSES

The Court in Wilson was attempting to promote "federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation." 105 S.Ct. at 1947. Retroactive application would neither retard nor promote these goals. Therefore, the second prong of the Huson test is inconclusive. Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc) (refusing to apply new statute of limitations retroactively); see also Smith, 764 F.2d at 196.

3. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF WILSON WOULD BE INEQUITABLE

As the court noted in Smith, "[w]here a plaintiff could have reasonably waited to file suit under the established prior rule, it would be inequitable to say he had slept on his rights because of a later and unforeseeable Supreme Court decision." 764 F.2d at 196. Prior to Wilson the statute of limitations in actions under § 1983 was three years. Since this case has been pending for almost two years based upon plaintiffs' reasonable reliance on a three year statute of limitations, it would be inequitable to apply Wilsonretroactively.4 Thus, the third prong of the Huson test is met.

Because the Huson test is met, Wilson should not be applied retroactively in this case.5 Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds are denied.

B. FAILURE TO ALLEGE A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

Defendants Pittsburg, Giacomelli, and Castiglione have also moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that it fails to allege a constitutional violation. They argue that the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies bars this court's consideration of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims under the rationale of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).


Defendants' argument fails in several respects. First, in Hudson v. Palmer, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Parratt stating that "postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action." In this case plaintiffs have alleged that defendants acted pursuant to a policy of exoneration; plaintiffs do not allege merely commission of a random and unauthorized act which defendants could not have predicted. Therefore, the rationale of Parratt is inapplicable.

Moreover, even if the shooting death of plaintiffs' son were a random and unauthorized act, plaintiffs might still have an action under § 1983 despite the availability of a state remedy. In Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356-57 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc) (citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit noted that

Parratt and Hudson did not decide, and we do not reach the question, whetherthe availability of some remedial relief in state court might be imposed as a bar to federal relief under § 1983 in the myriad fact situations that might present themselves in other cases against state and local government officials. Parratt and Hudson dealt with relatively minor infractions of prisoners' interests in their personal property, and did not deal with official assaults, batteries or other invasions of personal liberty.

Finally, to the extent that plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges violations of their substantive due process rights the procedural rationale of Parratt is inapplicable. In Parratt the Supreme Court recognized the distinction between procedural and substantive claims when it noted that the case involved only violation of "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter," in contrast to previous § 1983 cases before the Court involving fourth amendment and eighth amendment claims. 451 U.S. at 536, 101 S.Ct. at 1913. Courts in this circuit have also noted this distinction between substantive and procedural due process. See Haygood, at 1354-57 (court applies different analyses to Haygood's eighth amendment and due process claims); Garcia v. County of Los Angeles, 588 F.Supp. 700 (C.D.Cal.1984) (Parrattanalysis does not apply to substantive due process claims). If plaintiffs succeed in proving the allegations contained in their Second Amended Complaint, "defendants' conduct may have been sufficiently outrageous to constitute a violation of substantive due process." Garcia, 588 F.Supp. at 707.

The law of this circuit remains unsettled. In Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983), the court found a prisoner could assert a protectible liberty interest in certain prison transfer regulations. The prisoner was allowed to assert these under § 1983. However, in another case decided the same year the court applied Parratt and held that a prisoner was not deprived of due process where he not only could pursue state tort claims for injuries suffered at the hands of a guard, but had pursued those remedies. Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents,660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983).

Nevertheless, this circuit has recently made it clear that claims of excessive force may still be brought under § 1983 where they are based on Fourth Amendment grounds. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir.1985). Plaintiffs' allegations are grounded on the Fourth as well as the Fourteenth Amendment. The availability of state postdeprivation remedies does not bar Fourth Amendment claims. Id. at 1008-09.

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a constitutional violation is denied.

C. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Defendant Castiglione argues that this court should dismiss plaintiffs' second cause of action against him because respondeat superior is not a basis for imposing § 1983 liability. He cites the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), for this proposition. In Monell the Court held that local government entities may be sued under § 1983 only where the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights resulted from the execution or implementation of an official government policy.

The Supreme Court recently elaborated on its decision in Monell in City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). In Tuttle, the widow of a man shot by a police officer brought a § 1983 action alleging that a policy of inadequate training brought about her husband's death. The trial court allowed the jury in the case to infer a policy of inadequate training from the mere fact that the victim was shot to death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, andthe causal connection between the `policy' and the constitutional deprivation." 105 S.Ct. at 2436 (footnotes omitted).

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege more than a single incident; they allege an ongoing policy of inadequate training which caused their son's death and involved the injuries and deaths of other minorities. At this stage of the proceedings the allegations are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Therefore, Castiglione's motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied.

D. NO WRONGDOING BY CITY OF PITTSBURG

Defendant City of Pittsburg contends that this court should dismiss the fifth cause of action since it contains no allegation of wrongdoing by the City. Plaintiffs conceded this at oral argument. Therefore, the claim is dismissed as to the City of Pittsburg.

III. CONCLUSION

This court dismisses the fifth cause of action of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as to defendant City of Pittsburg. The motions to dismiss are otherwise denied for the reasons stated herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the purposes of this order the court refers to plaintiffs jointly, although certain claims are held only by the administrator.

2. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint does not differ substantively from their First Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint simply adds Dorothy Bynum in her capacity as administrator.

3. Defendants contend that the Supreme Court itself mandated that Wilson be applied retroactively. The Court remanded Springfield Township School District v. Knoll, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2065, 85 L.Ed.2d 275 (1985), for reconsideration in light of Wilson. It did not, as defendants suggest, tell the court of appeals to apply Wilson retroactively. Moreover, in Wilson, the Court seemed to recognize that there might indeed be cases in which the decision should not be applied retroactively. ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 1941-42 n. 10 (the Court cites Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 655 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), a case decided the same day as the circuit opinion in Wilson which refuses to apply the new personal injury statute of limitations retroactively).

4. The court is aware that plaintiffs' former counsel was less than diligent in pursuing this case. However, it was reluctant to penalize plaintiffs for this absent some acquiesence on their part. Plaintiffs obtained new counsel who has been diligent. The equities still balance in plaintiffs' favor.


5. Another district court judge in this Circuit has also suggested that retroactive application of Wilson is inappropriate in the Ninth Circuit. See Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, 618 F.Supp. 722(N.D.Cal.1985).
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Bennett v. Collins



Related articles: 


The building inspector died after he was linked to CNET 


Documents linking Collins to Danville Police, Tanabe, Lombardi and CNET.  


Gary Vinson Collins was killed in 2011 weeks after I gave Chief Bryden documents linking Danville to CNET.  


http://contracostawatch.blogspot.com/2013/03/obit-gary-vinson-collins-danville.html

Bennett V. Collins



Peter Bennett
PO Box 523
Alamo CA 94507
Telephone:       (925) 705-1812
Facsimile:        (000) 000-0000

In Pro Per




SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA-UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

Pete Bennett

                            Plaintiff,     
              v.

Gary Collins, and DOES 1-20, inclusive,

                            Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR ASSAULT, BATTERY, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, TRESPASS TO REAL PROPERTY, TRESPASS TO PERSONAL PROPERTY, CONVERSION AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS


           
Plaintiff alleges:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Defendant Gary Collins is an individual.  Plaintiff Pete Bennett is informed and believes that, at all times herein mentioned, defendant Gary Collins was a resident of Contra Costa County, California.
2. Defendants Doe 1 through Doe 20, inclusive, are sued herein under fictitious names. Their true names and capacities are unknown to plaintiff. When their true names and capacities are ascertained, plaintiff will amend this complaint by inserting their true names and capacities herein.  Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that plaintiff's damages as herein alleged were proximately caused by those defendants. Each reference in this complaint to ''defendant,'' ''defendants,'' or a specifically named defendant refers also to all defendants sued under fictitious names.
3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned each of the defendants, including all defendants sued under fictitious names, was the agent and employee of each of the remaining defendants, and in doing the things hereinafter alleged, was acting within the course and scope of this agency and employment.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Assault)
4. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 3 this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
5. On or about September 21, 2004, defendant Gary Collins came to plaintiff Pete Bennett’s residence at 161 Valle Vista Drive in Danville, California.  Defendant Gary Collins menacingly approached and yelled threatening and offensive words at plaintiff, including threats of death and bodily harm.  Further, defendant Gary Collins attempted to strike and did, in fact, strike plaintiff, thereby inflicting bodily harm upon plaintiff.
6. In doing the acts as alleged above, defendant intended to cause plaintiff an apprehension of a harmful or an offensive contact with plaintiff's person.
7. As a result of defendant's acts as alleged above, plaintiff, in fact, was placed in great apprehension of a harmful contact with plaintiff's person.
8. At no time did plaintiff consent to any of the acts of defendant alleged above.
9. As a proximate result of the acts of defendant as alleged above, plaintiff suffered physical injuries to his elbow, shoulder, arm, knee, leg and chest.
10. As a proximate result of the acts of defendant as alleged above, plaintiff was hurt and injured in his health, strength, and activity, sustaining injury to his nervous system and person, all of which have caused, and continue to cause, plaintiff great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.  As a result of these injuries, plaintiff has suffered general damages.
11. As a further proximate result of defendant's acts, plaintiff has been damaged in that he has been required to expend money and incur obligations for medical services and treatment reasonably required in the treatment and relief of the injuries herein alleged.
12. As a further proximate result of the acts of defendant, plaintiff has incurred medical and related expenses.
13. Plaintiff is informed and believes that, as a further proximate result of the acts of defendant, plaintiff will continue to incur medical and related expenses.
14. As a further proximate result of the acts of defendant, plaintiff was prevented from participating in his usual occupation and thereby lost earnings to his damage.
15. Plaintiff is informed and believes that, as a further proximate result of the acts of defendant, plaintiff's present and future earning capacity has been impaired.
16. The aforementioned conduct of defendant was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Battery)
17. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 3 and 8 through 16 of this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
18. On or about September 21, 2004, defendant Gary Collins came to plaintiff Pete Bennett’s residence at 161 Valle Vista Drive in Danville, California.  Defendant Gary Collins struck plaintiff with his hands on multiple occasions and threw plaintiff to the ground.  Defendant Gary Collins pinned plaintiff to the ground by pressing his knees into plaintiff’s chest while plaintiff was on his back on the ground. 
19. In doing the acts as alleged above, defendant acted with the intent to make a contact with plaintiff's person.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(False Imprisonment)
20. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 3 and 9 through 16 of this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
            21. On or about September 21, 2004, defendant Gary Collins used physical force and threats of violence, including death threats, to confine plaintiff for a period of time, against his will and without his consent.  Following this period of detention, defendant released plaintiff without charging him with any crime or taking him before a magistrate.
            22. Immediately prior to the acts of defendant herein alleged, plaintiff had been peacefully working in the study in his residence, located at 161 Valle Vista Drive in Danville, California.
            23. Plaintiff did not steal, nor was he in the process of stealing, any property belonging to defendant or anyone else, nor had he committed any crime against defendant or anyone else.
            24. In imprisoning plaintiff, defendant acted with deliberate malice and for the purpose of harassing plaintiff and causing plaintiff physical and emotional harm.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass to Real Property)
25. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 3 and 9 through 16 of this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
26. On or about September 21, 2004, defendant Gary Collins intentionally entered a residence located at 161 Valle Vista Drive in Danville, California of which plaintiff is the occupant and possessor.
27. Plaintiff did not give defendant permission for the entry and, in fact, defendant entered plaintiff’s residence despite plaintiff’s explicit demands for defendant to leave.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass to Personal Property)
28. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
29. On or about September 21, 2004, defendant Gary Collins, without plaintiff's consent, threw plaintiff into an antique table owned by plaintiff.
            30. In doing the acts above, defendant proximately caused damage to said table.  Plaintiff is informed and believes that the cost to replace or repair said table is approximately $400.00.
31. The aforementioned conduct of defendant was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conversion)
            32. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
            33. At all times herein mentioned, and in particular on or about September 21, 2004, plaintiff was, and still is, the owner and was, and still is, entitled to the possession of the following personal property, namely: an antique table. 
34. Plaintiff is informed and believes that on or about September 21, 2004 and at 161 Valle Vista Drive in Danville, California, the property described above had an approximate value of $400.00.
            35. On or about September 21, 2004, defendant Gary Collins, without plaintiff’s consent, intentionally damaged said antique table by throwing plaintiff into it, all to plaintiff’s detriment.
            36. The aforementioned conduct of defendant was willful and malicious and was intended to oppress plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction Emotional Distress)
37. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 36 of this Complaint as if the same were fully stated herein.
38.  Defendant’s actions of physically attacking plaintiff, verbally intimidating plaintiff, damaging plaintiff’s personal property and trespassing on plaintiff’s real property, as alleged in this Complaint, were knowing, intentional, and willful, and done with a reckless disregard of the probability of causing plaintiff emotional distress.
39.  As a proximate result of defendant’s conduct, as alleged in this complaint, plaintiff suffered severe mental anguish and emotional and physical distress, all to his general damages.
            40. In acting in the manner described in this Complaint, defendant’s conduct was malicious and oppressive, and was carried out in willful and conscious disregard of plaintiff’s rights and safety and subjected plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
            WHEREFORE, plaintiff Pete Bennett demands against defendants, and each of them, as follows:
1. For general damages according to proof;
2. For medical and related expenses according to proof;
3. For lost earnings, past and future, according to proof;
4. For punitive damages;
5. For interest as allowed by law;
6. For costs of suit herein incurred; and
7. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.

Dated:                                                                        


                                                                                    ________________________
                                                                                    Peter Bennett
                                                                                    In Pro Per




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PEOPLE VS BENNETT, PETER CARVER Count 1, 2 and 3 DISMISSED




Update March 2018
All I wanted was to run my business, have fun with my family and sons.  Instead I kept getting beaten, burned, poisoned, arrested, jailed and run off the road.  


My sons are gone, my cars taken, my license taken, my computers, systems, domains and health then they killed my relatives.  Why I still do not know but I am sure it has something to with 9/11, AT&T, FBI Agent Frank Doyle Jr. 


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Case Information
Case Number:SCR81833
Case Title:PEOPLE VS BENNETT, PETER CARVER
Case Type:DISOBEY COURT ORDER
Filing Date:02/04/11

Parties
NameTypeAttorney
BENNETT, PETER CARVERDEFENDANTCOBERY, KRISTIN
   Charges
CountFiling DocumentDegreeCharge
1COMMisdemeanor (A)270    PCFAILURE TO PROVIDE
Plea:NG
Plea Date:08/29/11
Disposition:06/17/13
DISMISSED
Sentence:
2COMMisdemeanor (A)166(a)(4)    PCDISOBEY LAWFUL COURT ORDER
Plea:NG
Plea Date:08/29/11
Disposition:06/17/13
DISMISSED
Sentence:
3COMMisdemeanor (A)1320(a)    PCFAILURE TO APPEAR -RELEASED O/R 2/11/13
Plea:NG
Plea Date:04/08/13
Disposition:06/17/13
DISMISSED
Sentence:

Actions
DateAction Description
04/05/13O/R AGREEMENT SIGNED BY DEFT
04/03/13WARRANT RETURNED & FILED
04/03/13STATEMENT OF RIGHTS SIGNED BY DEFT
03/18/13BAIL BOND EXONERATED
  ALADDIN BB#SV5-40009064
03/06/13BAIL BOND EXONDERATION RETURNED
  WRONG ADDRESS--UNABLE TO FORWARD
02/27/13WARRANT ISSUED TO BCSO
02/26/13NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT $220.00 COURT COSTS
  ALADDIN BAIL BONDS SV5-4009064
02/26/13COMPLAINT FILED 1320(a) PC
  FTA 2/11/13
02/01/13STATEMENT OF RIGHTS SIGNED BY DEFT
02/01/13FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STMT FILED
  PD APPROVED
01/16/13MEMO OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
  MTN TO EXONERATE BAIL BOND PURS TO PC 1305c3
01/16/13MTN/NTC OF MTN: TO VACATE BAIL FORFEITURE AND
  EXONERATE BAIL BOND PURS TO PC 1305(c)(3)
01/15/13BAIL BOND EXONERATED
  ALVAREZ BAIL BOND A7-2249760
01/14/13WARRANT RETURNED & FILED
01/14/13O/R AGREEMENT SIGNED BY DEFT
11/06/12SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED
  ALVEREZ BAIL BOND A7-2249760
09/12/12NOTICE TO SURETY/BONDSMAN RE FORFEITURE
  ALADDIN BAIL BOND SV5-4009064
09/12/12WARRANT ISSUED TO BCSO
06/11/12SECOND NTC OF ASSESSMENT $220
  BB A7-2249760 ALVAREZ/AMERICAN CONTRACTORS
05/01/12NTC OF ASSESSMENT $220
  BB A7-2249760 ALVAREZ BB
04/12/12NTC: NTC OF RESCHEDULING
  COURT TRIAL RE-SETTING
03/23/12STATEMENT OF RIGHTS SIGNED BY DEFT
03/07/12BAIL BOND: SEAVIEW INSUR CO; ALADDIN BAIL BONDS
  BOND # SV5-4009064 & $5000
03/06/12WARRANT RETURNED & FILED
11/28/11WARRANT ISSUED TO BCSO
11/18/11NOTICE TO SURETY/BONDSMAN RE FORFEITURE
  BB A7-2249760 ALVAREZ BB
08/01/11STATEMENT OF RIGHTS SIGNED BY DEFT
08/01/11STIPULATION FOR COMMISSIONER TO SIT AS
  JUDGE PRO TEM
08/01/11FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STMT FILED
08/01/11STIPULATION FOR COMMISSIONER D. GUNN TO SIT AS
  JUDGE PRO TEM
08/01/11STATEMENT OF RIGHTS SIGNED BY DEFT
07/14/11BAIL BOND: AMERICAN CONTRACTORS; ALVAREZ BB
  BOND #A7-2249760 & $2500
07/12/11WARRANT RETURNED & FILED
  WITH WARRANT ABSTRACT
04/22/111ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY DDA JACK SCHAFER
  DA CASE NO. 0139009394-01 * DOB CORRECTED *
03/18/11WARRANT ISSUED TO BCSO
02/22/11CRIMINAL RETURNED MAIL: *see previous NTC TO
  APPEAR RETURNED UNDELIVERABLE
02/07/11NTC: ARRAIGNMENT
  270 166(a)(4) PC
02/04/11COMPLAINT FILED BY DDA SCHAFER
  DA 0139009394-01
02/04/11DECL FOR ARREST WARRANT

Events
DateTimeEvent DescriptionDept CodeDepartment/Judge
06/17/1308:30PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Disposition Date: 06/17/13
DISMISSED
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
05/20/1314:00COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 05/20/13
VACATED
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
05/20/1311:00COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 05/20/13
VACATED
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
04/08/1308:35SETTING FOR COURT TRIAL CT 1-2

Disposition Date: 04/08/13
TRIAL DATE SET
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
04/08/1308:35FUR ARRAIGNMT -ENTRY OF PLEA CT 3

Disposition Date: 04/08/13
PLED NOT GUILTY; SET FOR TRIAL
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
04/03/1315:00SETTING FOR COURT TRIAL
  *RETURN ON WARRANT

Disposition Date: 04/03/13
CONTINUED TO 4/8/13
BTATO BE ANNOUNCED
04/03/1315:00ARRAIGNMENT ON FTA (NON VOP) - COUNT 3
  *RETURN ON WARRANT

Disposition Date: 04/03/13
ARRAIGNED; PD RE-APPTD
BTATO BE ANNOUNCED
02/11/1308:30MTN: TO VACATE BAIL FORFEITURE AND
  EXONERATE BAIL BOND PURS TO PC 1305(c)(3

Disposition Date: 02/11/13
GRANTED; EXONERATED UPON PAYMENT OF COST
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
02/11/1308:30SETTING FOR COURT TRIAL
  *MTN TO ADDRESS BAIL FORF SET SAME DATE
  /TIME

Disposition Date: 02/11/13
FTA; 1320(a); O/R RVKD; B/W ORD; $20000
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
02/01/1308:30STNG FOR COURT TRIAL - BAIL FORF 9/10/12
  *RTN ON WARRANT*

Disposition Date: 02/04/13
CONTINUED TO 2/11/13
BTATO BE ANNOUNCED
09/10/1208:30SETTING FOR COURT TRIAL
  B/W HELD

Disposition Date: 09/10/12
FTA; BAIL FORF;B/W ORD; BAIL SET $10000
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
08/20/1211:00COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 08/20/12
TRIAL VACATED; FTA B/W HELD
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
07/23/1211:00COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 07/23/12
CONTINUED TO 8/20/12
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
06/18/1211:00COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 06/18/12
TRIAL DATE VACATED AND RESET
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
06/18/1211:00[D] MTN: CONTINUE

Disposition Date: 06/18/12
GRANTED
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
06/18/1208:37MARSDEN HEARING

Disposition Date: 06/18/12
DENIED
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
04/30/1208:30RESETTING OF COURT TRIAL
  ADDRESS BB#A7-2249760 FORF 11/14/11

Disposition Date: 04/30/12
TRIAL DATE RESET
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
04/23/1208:30RESETTING OF COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 04/12/12
VACATED;B10 NOT AVAILABLE;NTA SENT
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
03/23/1208:30RESETTING OF COURT TRIAL
  *RETURN ON WARRANT*

Disposition Date: 03/23/12
CONTINUED TO 4/23/12
BTATO BE ANNOUNCED
11/14/1114:00COURT TRIAL

Disposition Date: 11/14/11
FTA;$5000 B/W ORDRD;NOCITE;BAIL FORFEITD
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
11/07/1108:30TRIAL READINESS CONFERENCE

Disposition Date: 11/07/11
TRIAL DATE CONFIRMED
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
10/03/1108:30PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Disposition Date: 10/03/11
WAIVED JURY TRIAL; COURT TRIAL SET
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
08/29/1108:30FUR ARRAIGNMT -ENTRY OF PLEA, APP OF CSL

Disposition Date: 08/29/11
PLED NOT GLTY; WVD TIME; SET FOR PTC
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
08/01/1108:30ARRAIGNMENT
  *RETURN ON WARRANT*

Disposition Date: 08/01/11
ARRAIGNED; PD APPTD
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
03/14/1108:30ARRAIGNMENT
  270 166(a)(4) PC

Disposition Date: 03/14/11
FTA; A/W ORD; BAIL SET $2500
B10HON. DAVID E GUNN, COMMISSIONER
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